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In the early summer of 2002, rumors began circulating on pro-life 
websites of a nationwide “sting” of reproductive health clinics.1 
Conservative media attention swiftly focused2 on a report entitled 
“Child Predators: Exposing the Partnership Between Planned 
Parenthood, the National Abortion Federation and Men who 
Sexually Abuse Underage Girls.”3 The report claimed that clinics 
affiliated with Planned Parenthood and the National Abortion 
Federation4 were knowingly violating state and federal statutory rape 
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 1. See, e.g., Joseph Farah, Planned Parenthood on the Run, WORLDNETDAILY, May 30, 
2002, http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=27780 (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) (“Thanks 
to some hard work by dedicated people, this detestable organization [Planned Parenthood] is 
finally on the run.”). 
 2. See Pro-Life Group Launches Undercover Sting, FOXNEWS.COM, May 31, 2002, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,54079,00.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (discussing Life 
Dynamics’ campaign); see also Press Release, Life Dynamics, Investigation Shows Planned 
Parenthood, National Abortion Federation Caught Harboring Pedophiles (May 22, 2002) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 3. MARK CRUTCHER, CHILD PREDATORS: EXPOSING THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, THE NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION AND MEN WHO SEXUALLY 
ABUSE UNDERAGE GIRLS (2002), available at http://www.childpredators.com/Forms/ 
ChildPredators.pdf. 
 4. The Child Predators report and much of the Life Dynamics literature misleadingly 
refer to certain clinics as being “NAF facilities” or “NAF clinics.” See, e.g., Life Dynamics, 
About Life Dynamics, http://www.lifedynamics.com/Pro-life_Group/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) 
(referring to “America’s two largest abortion providers, Planned Parenthood & the National 
Abortion Federation (NAF)”). The National Abortion Federation (NAF) is a membership 
association of reproductive health care providers. National Abortion Federation, About NAF, 
http://prochoice.org/about_naf/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). As NAF neither manages 
nor administers any clinics, it is likely that Life Dynamics is using the phrase as shorthand to 
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and child abuse reporting requirements by failing to report the sexual 
abuse of their minor patients.5 
At least one state attorney general apparently agreed. In 
February 2005, Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline announced that 
he had subpoenaed the medical records of women who had obtained 
late-term abortions in Kansas during 2003.6 Kline had been seeking 
the records for five months, claiming that they were necessary to 
fulfill his duty “to investigate and prosecute child rape and other 
crimes in order to protect Kansas children.”7 The clinics that were 
challenging Kline’s expanded interpretation of the Kansas statutory-
rape reporting requirements in court8 were under a gag order; the 
women whose records had been subpoenaed did not know their 
medical records were being sought.9 The news leaked only when the 
clinics sought relief from the subpoenas in the Kansas Supreme 
Court.10 
Increasingly, statutory rape and child abuse reporting 
requirements are being used to threaten reproductive health clinics 
with legal prosecution. Life Dynamics president Mark Crutcher, 
 
refer to the independently owned (non-Planned-Parenthood-affiliated) clinics that are members 
of NAF. 
 5. Press release, Life Dynamics, supra note 2. 
 6. Jodi Wilgoren, Kansas Prosecutor Demands Files on Late-Term Abortion Patients, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at A1. 
 7. Press Release, Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline, Statement by Attorney General 
Phill Kline in Response to a Call for Investigation of the Rape of Kansas Children (Feb. 24, 
2005), available at http://www.accesskansas.org/ksag/Press/2005/0224childrenrape_statement. 
htm. 
 8. The case is still ongoing. A federal district court in Kansas ultimately agreed with the 
clinics and issued a narrow preliminary injunction against the mandatory reporting of 
consensual sexual activity of minors under the informational privacy theory, Aid for Women v. 
Foulston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1294 (D. Kan. 2004), but denied the clinics’ motion for summary 
judgment under the decisional privacy theory, Aid for Women v. Foulston, Case No. 03-1353-
JTM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33057, at *11 (D. Kan. Dec. 14, 2005). Informational privacy and 
decisional privacy are discussed infra Part II. The Tenth Circuit vacated the preliminary 
injunction in January, Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1121 (10th Cir. 2006), but the 
District Court issued a permanent injunction in April of 2006, Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 
F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1116 (D. Kan. 2006). Both parties have appealed. 
 9. See Wilgoren, supra note 6 (stating that the court record containing the subpoena was 
sealed). 
 10. David Klepper & Laura Bauer, Inquisition Grabs National Spotlight, KANSAS CITY 
STAR, Feb. 26, 2005, at B1. The Kansas Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the order 
requiring disclosure of unredacted patient files be withdrawn pending review of the legal 
arguments undergirding the Attorney General’s request. Alpha Med. Clinic v. Hon. Richard 
Anderson, 128 P.3d 364, 379 (Kan. 2006). Any further subpoenas would require a protective 
order redacting patient-identifying information before the files are delivered to the judge. Id. 
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author of the Child Predators report, claims that the attorneys general 
of at least ten states have requested information from his organization 
about prosecuting clinics for child sexual abuse.11 Because only 
abortion providers (and not adoption agencies, crisis pregnancy 
centers or other reproductive health care providers whose client 
populations often include adolescents) are being threatened with 
prosecution, the motive seems to be to intimidate women—especially 
minors—from obtaining abortion services by threatening that the 
government might learn their names. 
The promise of confidentiality is a cornerstone of the 
reproductive health services that Planned Parenthood and other 
clinics provide to their patients.12 Conversely, threats of public 
exposure have long been used by the more virulent pro-life factions 
to dissuade women from seeking abortion services.13 Equally 
intimidating to patients is the possibility of a government official 
poring over the details of their sexual histories.14 
Providers and pro-choice advocates have challenged this 
threatened disclosure of reproductive health records in a number of 
cases.15 These plaintiffs have utilized legal theories ranging from the 
 
 11. Laura McPhee, Mark Crutcher’s Obsession, Nuvo.net, Mar. 30, 2005, http://www.nuvo. 
net/archive/2005/03/30/mark_crutchers_obsession.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2006). The Indiana 
Attorney General is also seeking medical records from 73 adolescent patients who obtained 
reproductive health services at Planned Parenthood clinics in Indiana. Michele McNeil, Planned 
Parenthood, State Spar Over Files, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 15, 2005, at 1A. 
 12. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, This is Planned Parenthood, 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/who-we-are/this-is-planned-parenthood.htm (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2006) (“Committed, professional staff . . . take time to talk with clients, 
encouraging them to ask questions and discuss their feelings in a confidential setting.”); see also 
Open Letter from Karen Pearl, Interim President, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 
to Planned Parenthood Clients (Feb. 25, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (reassuring 
patients that “everyone who counts on Planned Parenthood can trust in the confidential care 
[they] provide.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 827–28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (describing the 
behavior of two defendants who collected information about women seeking abortions and 
stood at the entrance to a clinic with signs bearing the women’s names); see also Yochi J. 
Dreazen, In the Shadows: Photos of Women Who Get Abortions Go up on Internet, WALL ST. J., 
May 28, 2002, at A1. 
 14. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy 
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (“Even if formal 
prosecution of abortions remains beyond the constitutionally permitted power of the state, a 
health department official who is able to obtain and publish the names of women seeking 
abortions can exercise a deterrent almost as effective as prosecution.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Aid for Women v. Foulston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1294 (D. Kan. 2004) 
(challenging the constitutionality of a reporting statute); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, 
Inc., v. Iowa Dist. Ct., Buena Vista Cty., No. 02-1191 (Sept. 22, 2002) (seeking to prevent release 
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Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful searches and 
seizures16 to the Supreme Court’s undue burden jurisprudence;17 
others have proposed bringing challenges instead under state or 
federal law.18 It is the informational privacy prong of the 
Constitution’s right to privacy, however, that may provide the best 
protection for clinics seeking to defend against these mandatory 
reporting statutes. 
This Note argues that the Constitution’s right to informational 
privacy protects minor abortion patients from having their medical 
records disclosed to government agencies under broadly interpreted 
child abuse reporting requirements. Part I provides a brief overview 
of state statutory-rape reporting requirements and describes the 
increasing politicization of those requirements in the abortion 
context. Part II discusses the Constitution’s right to informational 
privacy, highlights the different approaches taken by the circuit courts 
to informational privacy jurisprudence, and outlines the prevailing 
balancing test approach. Part III explains how the right applies to 
statutory-rape reporting requirements and concludes that the 
informational privacy right must be extended to protect adolescents 
from release of their medical records. Although courts have hesitated 
to expand informational privacy, the potentially catastrophic effect on 
minors’ access to basic reproductive health care and the constitutional 
guarantee that mature minor women be able to obtain confidential 
abortion services weigh heavily against permitting release of the 
records. 
I.  ABORTION POLITICS AND STATUTORY-RAPE REPORTING 
Pro-life groups, including Life Dynamics, have capitalized on the 
political popularity of strong statutory-rape reporting requirements to 
 
of the records of all patients with positive pregnancy test results, which county officials claimed 
were necessary to investigate the death of an abandoned newborn). 
 16. See Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d 1173, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 
state regulation that allowed warrantless searches of abortion clinics at times when patients 
could be present violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 17. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 786–89 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting argument that possible loopholes in state judicial bypass procedure, which could allow 
for public disclosure of minors’ identities, violated due process). 
 18. Recent Case, District Court Grants Preliminary Injunction Against Enforcement of State 
Law Requiring Reporting of All Sexual Activity by Minors—Aid for Women v. Foulston, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 778, 784–85 (2004). 
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encourage legal prosecution of abortion providers.19 During the nine-
month preparation of the Child Predators report, Life Dynamics 
volunteers phoned Planned Parenthood and NAF member clinics 
across the country posing as a thirteen-year-old girl seeking an 
abortion in order to cover up a sexual relationship with her twenty-
two-year-old boyfriend.20 According to Life Dynamics, the responses 
from clinic staff varied. Some warned the caller that her “boyfriend” 
was committing a crime and could be prosecuted for statutory rape; 
some allegedly instructed the caller, once she had disclosed the age of 
her boyfriend, to call back for an appointment and not mention the 
age of her older partner.21 The Child Predators report claimed that 
clinics had not only violated state laws by failing to comply with 
statutory-rape reporting requirements, but were also “participating in 
an ongoing or future crime” involving “actual complicity” in child 
sexual abuse by providing patients that they knew were sexually 
active with birth control.22 
Other pro-life groups rushed to laud Crutcher’s work. Wendy 
Wright of Concerned Women for America cited the Child Predators 
report as “clear evidence that those in the abortion industry have 
[no] . . . respect for the law,” and encouraged local prosecutors to 
 
 19. Life Dynamics’ president, Mark Crutcher, has a long history of similar attempts to 
expose “the abortion industry” to legal prosecution. See generally Life Dynamics, Help Abortion 
Clinic Workers, http://www.lifedynamics.com/Abortion_Prolife/Abortion_Info/ (last visited Oct. 
23, 2006) (detailing a Clinic Worker project that warns clinic staff of possible legal exposure as 
accomplices to certain crimes); Life Dynamics, Spies for Life, http://lifedynamics.com/Anti-
Abortion_Prolife/Anti-Abortion_Clinics/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (encouraging volunteers to 
send in “any dirt that you can dig up about any abortionist, abortion clinic, [or] clinic 
employee”). His results have been mixed. 
In 2000, former tissue company employee Lawrence Dean Alberty, Jr. claimed to ABC 
News that body parts harvested from aborted fetuses were being sold at a profit to stem-cell 
researchers, in violation of the law. See 20/20 Wednesday: Parts for Sale; People Make 
Thousands of Dollars off the Sale of Fetal Body Parts (ABC News television broadcast Mar. 8, 
2000) (transcript on file with author). Alberty acknowledged that he had been paid $10,000 by 
Life Dynamics to produce the video that ran on the program. Id. At a congressional hearing on 
March 9, subcommittee members confronted Alberty with an affidavit in which he had 
previously admitted that he knew of no instances in which the tissue was sold for profit. He then 
recanted much of his congressional testimony. Stacey Zolt, Fetal Tissue Hearing Thrown Into 
Chaos, ROLL CALL, Mar. 13, 2000. 
 20. CRUTCHER, supra note 3, at 3. 
 21. Id.; see also Audio Recording: Phone Call from Life Dynamics to Clinic in Colorado, 
available at http://www.childpredators.com/Clip8.m3u (“So what you need to do is call 
back . . . .”). 
 22. CRUTCHER, supra note 3, at 6. 
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investigate clinics for evidence of crime.23 Conservative Internet news 
outlets swiftly picked up the story, linking the alleged cover-up to the 
pedophilia scandals then rocking the Catholic Church, and urging 
criminal prosecution of clinics.24 Clinic protestors in Lubbock, Texas 
phoned local police to report a statutory rape after watching two 
teenage girls enter an abortion clinic with their mothers.25 Officers 
questioned the girls about their sexual partners but no charges were 
ever filed.26 
The events that followed the Child Predators report were not the 
first to subject reproductive health clinics to public scrutiny for 
potential violations of child abuse and statutory-rape reporting 
requirements. A 1984 California Attorney General opinion 
interpreted that state’s child abuse reporting statute to require “[a] 
report . . . when a child under age 14 receives medical attention for a 
sexually transmitted disease, for pregnancy or for abortion,” 
regardless of whether the sexual activity was consensual.27 Planned 
Parenthood challenged the opinion on the ground that it had a strong 
interest in providing confidential reproductive health care to the 
state’s minors.28 A state appellate court rejected the opinion as 
contrary to the intent of the legislature, noting the inconsistency 
between the interpretation and a state law allowing confidential 
access to reproductive health care for minors.29 The fact that 
 
 23. Press Release, Concerned Women for America, CWA Blasts Abortion Providers for 
Helping Sex Offenders Cover Their Crime (May 24, 2002), http://www.cwfa.org/ 
articledisplay.asp?id=1540&department=MEDIA&categoryid=life) (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
 24. See Rusty Pugh, Abortionists Implicated in Alleged Rape Coverup, AGAPEPRESS, May 
24, 2003, http://headlines.agapepress.org/archive/5/242002a.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2006); see 
also Jon Dougherty, Planned Parenthood Concealing Crimes?, WORLDNETDAILY, May 21, 
2002, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=27687 (last visited Oct. 10, 
2006). 
 25. David Pasztor, Abortion Foes Involve Police in New Tactic: Group’s Linking of Child 
Abuse to Teen Pregnancy Alarms Rights Advocates, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 29, 
2002, at A1. In a guide written for clinic protestors, Crutcher encourages volunteers to call the 
police when they see young-looking women enter an abortion clinic—in part because “for the 
owner of an abortion [clinic], having the police come into your waiting room a couple of times a 
day can’t be too good for business.” Mark Crutcher, Eyewitness: Child Sexual Abuse and 
Abortion Clinics, a Guide for Sidewalk Counselors, http://www.myfaith.com/EYEWITNESS--
BOOK.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2006). 
 26. Pasztor, supra note 25. 
 27. 67 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 235 (1984), 1984 Cal. AG LEXIS 54, at *15. 
 28. Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Cal. v. Van de Kamp, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363–64 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
 29. Id. at 373–74. 
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California’s state constitutional privacy guarantee is much broader 
than the federal one played a significant role in that case.30 
Currently, every state has laws that regulate sexual intercourse 
with a minor under a certain age.31 The phrase “statutory rape” does 
not generally appear in the criminal code;32 the relevant statutes 
instead prohibit unlawful rape,33 unlawful sexual intercourse,34 or 
sexual assault.35 Statutory rape statutes vary widely in scope and 
method; some criminalize all sexual activity with a minor below a 
certain age,36 while others condition criminal liability on the 
difference in ages between the victim and the perpetrator.37 Some 
states employ several different methods.38 Suspected statutory rape 
violations may mandate that certain persons report the incident to the 
proper government authorities,39 but reporting requirements vary 
widely.40 In one-third of the states, reporting is required only when 
the abuser has direct responsibility for the care of the child.41 Some 
 
 30. Stephanie Bornstein, The Undue Burden: Parental Notification Requirements for 
Publicly Funded Contraception, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 40, 71–72 (2000). 
 31. NOY S. DAVIS & JENNIFER TWOMBLY, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE 
LAW, STATE LEGISLATORS’ HANDBOOK FOR STATUTORY RAPE ISSUES 1 (2000). 
 32. Chinué Turner Richardson & Cynthia Dailard, Politicizing Statutory Rape Reporting 
Requirements: A Mounting Campaign?, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2005, at 1, 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/3/gr080301.pdf. 
 33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773(a) (2000) (“A person is guilty of rape . . . 
when . . . the victim has not yet reached his twelfth birthday.”). 
 34. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (West 2001) (“Unlawful sexual intercourse is an 
act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a . . . minor.”). 
 35. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-402-(1)(d), (1)(f) (West 2001) (describing 
crime as “sexual assault” when victim is less than fifteen years of age and actor is at least four 
years older, or when victim is between fifteen and seventeen years of age and actor is at least 
ten years older). 
 36. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2002) (defining criminal sexual conduct in the first 
degree as sexual battery with a victim less than eleven years old). 
 37. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (West 2001) (criminalizing sexual intercourse with 
a victim under the age of sixteen when the person is four or more years older than the victim). 
 38. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 566.032, 566.034 (West 2002) (classifying statutory rape as 
occurring when the victim is less than fourteen years old or if the victim is younger than 
seventeen and the perpetrator is twenty-one or older). 
 39. All states include sexual abuse in the list of forms of abuse that must be reported, but 
not every state’s definition includes statutory rape. Abigail English & Catherine Teare, 
Statutory Rape Enforcement and Child Abuse Reporting: Effects on Health Care Access for 
Adolescents, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 827, 838–39 (2001). 
 40. ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 10 (2004), available at http://www.lewin.com/Lewin_Publications/ 
Human_Services/StateLawsReport.htm. 
 41. Id. 
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state statutes specify that the reporter must have evidence or 
suspicion that a child has been injured or harmed by the sexual 
activity, and others provide a measure of discretion to the health care 
provider.42 Statutorily mandated reporters usually include educational 
officials, law enforcement officials, social workers, and child and 
health care providers.43 The report is generally not made directly to 
law enforcement, but rather to Child Protective Services or a similar 
state agency.44 
The 1990s brought increasing levels of legal and political 
attention to the criminalization of statutory rape.45 In 1995, a study 
released in Family Planning Perspectives indicated that nearly two-
thirds of teenage mothers had partners who were at least twenty years 
old.46 The subsequent media attention attributed the supposed 
epidemic of teenage pregnancy to predatory older men;47 
policymakers rushed to action. Congress, for example, responded 
with provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
 
 42. Connecticut takes the first approach; a 2002 Attorney General opinion does not require 
reporting of sexual activity of adolescents under the age of consent but older than thirteen 
unless some other evidence of abuse exists. Conn. Op. Att’y Gen., No. 2002-149, 2002 Conn. 
AG LEXIS 33, at *15 (Sept. 30, 2002), cited in GLOSSER, supra note 40, at 12; see also LA. 
CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 609(a)(1) (2001) (requiring report when mandatory reporter has 
reasonable cause to believe that the child’s physical or mental health is endangered as a result of 
abuse or neglect), cited in English & Teare, supra note 39, at 851. One state, Wisconsin, includes 
statutory rape on the list of reportable forms of child abuse, but exempts certain providers of 
health care to adolescents from the requirements. Id. at 851–52. 
 43. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and 
Neglect, http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2006). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See generally Rigel Oliveri, Note, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of 
Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2000). Ongoing debates over teen pregnancy and 
welfare reform, in concert with stricter societal attitudes towards crime, made the mid-1990s an 
especially fertile period for statutory rape reform and resurgence. English & Teare, supra note 
39, at 828. 
 46. David Landry & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, How Old are U.S. Fathers?, FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP., July–Aug. 1995, at 159, 160. Mark Crutcher cited this study and others in the Child 
Predators report as evidence for his argument that “men who prey on underage girls” are the 
“driving force behind this tragedy.” CRUTCHER, supra note 3, at 1. 
 47. See generally Elizabeth Hollenberg, Note, The Criminalization of Teenage Sex: 
Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y. REV. 267 (1999) 
(arguing that the “new narrative” of teenage mother as sexual abuse victim led to a misplaced 
emphasis on statutory rape, as opposed to education or public health measures, as means of 
combating teen pregnancies). 
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Reconciliation Act of 1994;48 that legislation called for additional 
prosecution of statutory rape on the state level, and mandated studies 
on the number of teen pregnancies that resulted from sexual activity 
with older partners.49 Changes to the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act, the federal law that sets the minimum standard for 
state definitions of child abuse,50 amended the definition of sexual 
abuse to include certain types of statutory rape—notably, those 
involving family members or caretaker relationships.51 
Significant state activity followed the federal lead. Tennessee, 
which had previously required reporting of statutory rape when the 
child was younger than thirteen, raised the mandatory reporting age 
to fifteen.52 California amended its reporting requirements to include 
sexual acts between minors under age sixteen and adults over twenty-
one.53 A survey conducted by the American Bar Association’s Center 
on Children and the Law noted that between 1995 and 1997, two 
other states—Tennessee and Virginia—considered, but did not enact, 
legislation that would have included statutory rape within the 
mandatory child abuse reporting laws.54 
Studies show that stricter statutory rape laws and reporting 
requirements are not an effective weapon against increased teen 
pregnancy rates.55 The method, however, continues to be politically 
popular. In 2004, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
 48. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.) 
(2000). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 14016(b)(1)-(2) (2000). 
 50. Child Welfare Information Gateway, What is Child Abuse and Neglect?, 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/whatiscan.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
 51. English & Teare, supra note 39, at 837–38. The authors argue that the inclusion of only 
certain types of rape indicates that the federal government does not believe all forms of 
statutory rape constitute child abuse. Id. 
 52. DAVIS & TWOMBLY, supra note 31, at 3. 
 53. Assemb. B. 327, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), cited in Hollenberg, supra note 47, at 
275. 
 54. DAVIS & TWOMBLY, supra note 31, at 4. 
 55. See Luisa Franzini, Projected Economic Costs Due to Health Consequences of 
Teenagers’ Loss of Confidentiality in Obtaining Reproductive Health Services in Texas, 158 
ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 1140, 1141 (2004) (predicting that changes in 
Texas law that reduced confidentiality of care would actually result in an increase in teen 
births); see also Patricia Donovan, Can Statutory Rape Laws be Effective in Preventing 
Adolescent Pregnancy?, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 34 (noting that older man-young 
girl relationships account for only a small fraction of teenage births). 
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sponsored a conference on the sexual exploitation of teenagers.56 One 
panel focused exclusively on state responses to statutory rape,57 and 
Kansas Attorney General Kline discussed his efforts to expand 
reporting requirements in his state.58 In June 2003, Kline drafted an 
opinion letter reinterpreting the state’s child abuse reporting statute.59 
Under Kline’s letter, illegal sexual activity by or with an adolescent 
under age 16 was de facto injurious and had to be reported to 
government officials.60 On behalf of several clinics, the Center for 
Reproductive Rights, a pro-choice legal organization, filed a lawsuit 
challenging the Attorney General’s opinion as violating adolescents’ 
right to informational privacy.61 
Two years after the revised opinion, Kline announced that his 
office had requested the release of the medical records of ninety 
women who had received abortions in 2003;62 Kline claimed that he 
needed the records to look for evidence of child abuse. In response to 
the news, Planned Parenthood Federation of America issued an open 
letter to Planned Parenthood clients, reassuring them of the 
organization’s commitment to medical privacy.63 Shortly after Kline’s 
subpoenas came to light, Planned Parenthood of Indiana reported 
that an agent of the Indiana Medicaid Fraud Unit had entered three 
Planned Parenthood health centers in the state and seized the records 
of eight Medicaid patients.64 Indiana Attorney General Steve Carter, 
 
 56. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, OJJPD Announces Conference on Sexual 
Exploitation of Teens (Mar. 8, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 57. Transcripts, State Laws and Legal Issues, Conference on Sexual Exploitation of Teens, 
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.cademedia.com/archives/ 
mchb/owh/protectingteens/transcripts/3b.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
 58. Transcript, Presentation of Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline on State Laws and 
Legal Strategies, Conference on Sexual Exploitation of Teens, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human 
Services (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.cademedia.com/archives/mchb/owh/protectingteens/ 
transcripts/3b.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
 59. The Kansas statute requires state-mandated reporters, including persons “licensed to 
practice the healing arts,” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522(a) (West 2005), to report to government 
officials whenever they have reason “to suspect that a child has been injured as a result of 
physical, mental or emotional abuse or neglect or sexual abuse.” 
 60. Kan. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 2003-17, 2003 Kan. AG LEXIS at *2–3 (June 18, 2003). 
 61. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099 (D. Kan. 2006) (noting that the 
Attorney General’s opinion was a departure from previous constructions of the reporting 
statute by former attorneys general, who had interpreted the law to mean that illegal sexual 
activity may be, but is not inherently, injurious). 
 62. Press Release, Statement of Attorney General Phill Kline, supra note 7. 
 63. See Open Letter from Karen Pearl, supra note 12 (“Planned Parenthood unequivocally 
stands in defense of the privacy of the medical records of our clients.”). 
 64. McNeil, supra note 11. 
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claiming to be acting under his office’s authority to investigate fraud, 
patient abuse and neglect, later requested the files of an additional 
seventy-three patients, all Medicaid recipients under the age of 
fourteen.65 Planned Parenthood sued to block the release.66 
II.  INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
The Supreme Court recognizes that the constitutional right to 
privacy encompasses a protection against the disclosure of the 
intimate details of private life. This protection extends naturally to 
medical records and may be retained even in the face of a state’s 
attempt to obtain the information. Indeed, the first discussion of an 
informational privacy right occurred in the context of a state attempt, 
driven by public policy concerns about drug abuse, to collect private 
medical information. Most of the courts to examine the informational 
privacy right balance a number of factors, including the nature of the 
government interest in the information and the level of sensitivity of 
the private information. 
It breaks no new ground to note that the United States 
Constitution does not contain an explicit right to privacy.67 The 
existence of such a right was first discussed in a seminal article 
authored by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.68 The Court’s first 
recognition of the constitutional right to privacy came in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,69 striking down a Connecticut statute that prohibited the 
sale or use of contraceptives.70 Justice William Douglas placed the 
marital relationship “within the zone of privacy created by several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees,”71 among them the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination.72 Seven 
 
 65. Monica Davey, Planned Parenthood Sues Over Records Request in Indiana, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at A27. 
 66. Id. Planned Parenthood’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied at the trial 
level but granted by the Court of Appeals. Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 
853, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 67. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 695 (2001). 
 68. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). Brandeis later famously opined that the right to privacy was “the right to be let alone.” 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 485. 
 72. Id. at 484–85. 
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years later, the Court redefined the Griswold right—from preventing 
intrusion in the marital relationship to a much broader right to 
reproductive autonomy—in Eisenstadt v. Baird.73 Reflecting but not 
explicitly recognizing the shift, Brennan wrote that “[i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child.”74 
The constitutional right to privacy encompasses not only the 
right to freely make autonomous decisions regarding private matters, 
but also the right to keep the intimate details of those private 
matters—and decisions—confidential.75 In Whalen v. Roe,76 the Court 
upheld a New York law requiring physicians to record the names, 
ages, and addresses of all patients for whom prescriptions for certain 
drugs had been written.77 The records were kept on file with the state 
Department of Health for five years and then destroyed, and the 
room in which they were held was secured by a locked fence and 
alarm system.78 Public disclosure of a patient’s identity was expressly 
prohibited by state statute.79 
The doctors (and their patients) had argued that the threat of 
unwarranted disclosure of private information would dissuade some 
patients from seeking medical care.80 The Court rebuffed the 
argument that this was sufficient to nullify the statute and, by 
extension, rejected the idea that the state law had deprived any 
patient of the right to make independent decisions.81 The Court noted 
that the state had neither entirely prohibited the use of the drugs, nor 
conditioned access on third-party consent: “[T]he decision to 
prescribe, or to use, is left entirely to the physician and the patient.”82 
 
 73. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 74. Id. 
 75. The second form of the right involves the “right of an individual not to have his private 
affairs made public by the government.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (quoting 
Phillip Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 8). 
 76. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 77. Id. at 591. 
 78. Id. at 593–94. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 600. 
 81. Id. at 602–03. 
 82. Id. at 603. 
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Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens seemed to agree that 
there was a second prong to the privacy right: the right of the patients 
to keep their medical information confidential. Noting that “[t]he 
cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact 
involved at least two different kinds of interests,” Stevens went on to 
describe one of the interests as “the individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.”83 This right could conceivably have 
been implicated by the New York law, but no constitutional rights 
were violated by the factual circumstances presented in the case.84 
Stevens went on to write that the statute at issue and other state 
confidentiality provisions provided enough assurance that patient 
records would not be disclosed to the public.85 The mere possibility of 
an unwarranted disclosure, either by the Department of Health or 
during the course of judicial or administrative proceedings against a 
doctor, was not enough to void the statute.86 In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Brennan noted explicitly that a “[b]road dissemination” by 
state officials of private medical information would “clearly implicate 
constitutionally protected privacy rights,” and argued that only a 
compelling state interest would justify such dissemination.87 
The Court again examined the right to keep private information 
confidential later that same year, when it rejected a challenge by 
former president Richard Nixon to a federal statute requiring 
national archivists to examine presidential information.88 The Court’s 
decision was the culmination of a battle between the former president 
and Congress over the ownership of 42 million pages of documents 
and 880 tape recordings from Nixon’s time in office.89 The 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act90 specifically 
provided for the return of any communications of a purely personal 
nature.91 Nixon did not deny the public interest inherent in the vast 
 
 83. Id. at 598–99. 
 84. See id. at 605 (“Recognizing that in some circumstances [the duty of the government to 
avoid unwarranted disclosures of private information] arguably has its roots in the 
Constitution . . . .”). 
 85. Id. at 601–02. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 88. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457–59 (1977). 
 89. Id. at 430–31. 
 90. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 
Stat. 1695 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.). 
 91. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 § 104(a)(7). 
04__BODGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:08 PM 
596 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:583 
majority of the documents, which he agreed were related to his 
government service. Rather, he argued that his privacy interests 
would be violated by the process of screening the “extremely private 
communications between him and . . . his wife, his daughters, his 
physician, lawyer, and clergyman, and his close friends”92 from the 
majority of documents dealing with his government service.93 
In upholding the Act, the Court recognized that the former 
president had a “legitimate expectation of privacy in [his personal 
communications].”94 The Court, however, weighed that privacy 
interest against the government’s interest in obtaining the materials, 
and found the privacy interest wanting. On the intrusion side, the 
Court considered the archivists’ “unblemished” record for examining 
sensitive personal materials,95 and the difficulty in separating the small 
number of potentially personal materials from the “42 million pages 
of documents and 880 tape recordings” that the statute would require 
the Administration to turn over.96 The Court again cited the many 
specific statutory protections against unwarranted disclosure of the 
information contained in the Act; the Act provided for regulations to 
prevent dissemination and stipulated that any purely private 
information would be returned to the government official.97 Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the Court held that the government interest in 
obtaining the information overwhelmed what was a minimal privacy 
intrusion.98 Even the President conceded that many of the materials to 
be turned over had been prepared by his staff, and much of it he had 
not even seen.99 
The Supreme Court has not always been clear, however, when 
determining the requisite level of confidentiality that should attend 
the provision of abortion services. In one pre-Whalen case upholding 
a state requirement that physicians compile information on the 
number of abortions they performed, the Court noted that 
recordkeeping provisions that were “reasonably directed to the 
 
 92. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 359 (D.D.C. 1976). 
 93. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 456. 
 94. Id. at 458. The majority noted that “when Government intervention is at stake,” even 
public officials retain constitutionally protected privacy rights in personal matters unrelated to 
their status as public figures. Id. at 457. 
 95. Id. at 452. 
 96. Id. at 449. 
 97. Id. at 450. 
 98. Id. at 465. 
 99. Id. at 459. 
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preservation of maternal health and that properly respect[ed] a 
patient’s confidentiality and privacy” were permissible.100 Under the 
then-prevailing strict scrutiny test articulated in Roe v. Wade,101 the 
Court focused only on whether the state’s compelling interest in the 
preservation of maternal health outweighed any negative impact on a 
woman’s autonomous abortion decision or the physician-patient 
relationship.102 Seeing no “legally significant” impact, the majority 
concluded that, though Missouri’s statute “approach[ed] 
impermissible limits,” it did not exceed them.103 
The confidentiality prong of the privacy right explicitly entered 
the Court’s abortion jurisprudence in a muddled fashion two years 
after Whalen. In a four-Justice concurrence, Justice Stevens 
articulated his belief that essential to the privacy right was the ability 
to exercise the right “without public scrutiny and in defiance of the 
contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties.”104 Stevens 
seemed to conflate the autonomy and confidentiality prongs of the 
privacy right in exactly the manner that the Whalen majority had 
rejected. In other words, the fact that the informational privacy right 
had been violated (making the abortion decision a public one) made 
it more likely that the autonomy right would be violated (ensuing 
public pressure would make women less able to freely make the 
abortion decision). 
A somewhat clearer picture emerged in 1986, when the Court 
struck down Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act.105 Section 3214 of 
the Act imposed certain reporting requirements on abortion 
providers: first, that they forward to the state a detailed individual 
report on each abortion they had performed, including the physician’s 
name and the name of the facility where the abortion was performed, 
the woman’s age, race, marital status and number of prior 
pregnancies, her political subdivision and state of residence, and 
method of payment;106 second, the physician was required to sign the 
 
 100. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976). 
 101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 102. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 80. 
 103. Id. In so concluding, the Court relied heavily on the ability of Missouri to protect its 
citizens’ private information. See id. at 81 (“The added requirements for confidentiality 
[contained in the statute] . . . assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional 
limits.”). 
 104. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 105. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986). 
 106. Id. at 765. 
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report.107 After a “unique identifying number” was substituted for the 
physician’s name (the name of the facility was left unredacted), the 
entire report was to be made available to the public108 within fifteen 
days of receipt.109 
The combination of the vast amount of information collected and 
that information’s availability to the public was sufficient to overcome 
the state’s assertion that it had a compelling interest in keeping the 
records.110 It was of no consequence that the statute explicitly deemed 
the collected data not to be “public record[].”111 Moreover, because 
the Pennsylvania law required such seemingly unrelated data as the 
method of payment and the woman’s personal history, it went far 
beyond the statistical use condoned in Danforth.112 
In reaching the decision, the Court seemed to rely on the 
reasoning rejected in Whalen, stating that the threat of public 
disclosure and the resultant “chilling” effect on a patient’s behavior 
were enough to reject the statute: 
We note, as we reach this conclusion, that . . . Pennsylvania’s 
reporting requirements raise the specter of public exposure and 
harassment of women who choose to exercise their personal, 
intensely private, right, with their physician, to end a pregnancy. 
Thus, they pose an unacceptable danger of deterring the exercise of 
that right, and must be invalidated.113 
No explicit mention was made of the confidentiality prong of the right 
to privacy, however. 
Any excitement advocates may have felt at this apparent 
acknowledgement that a threat of disclosure implicated the autonomy 
prong of the privacy right, however, was short lived. A later 
challenge, again to Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act, replaced 
the strict scrutiny analysis established in Roe with the undue burden 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellees at 19, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (No. 84-495). 
 109. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765. 
 110. Id. at 766–68. 
 111. Id. at 766. 
 112. Id. at 765–66. 
 113. Id. at 767–68. The Court cited as precedent a long line of First Amendment cases that 
had “refused to allow government to chill the exercise of constitutional rights by requiring 
disclosure of protected, but sometimes unpopular, activities.” Id. at 767. 
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standard first propounded by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.114 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey115 upheld 
Pennsylvania’s narrow “medical emergency” definition, the 
requirement that a physician deliver a state-drafted speech 
acknowledging the alternatives to and risks of the abortion 
procedure, and a twenty-four-hour waiting period, but struck down 
the statute’s requirement that married women notify their husbands 
before obtaining an abortion.116 The relegation of the abortion right 
from a fundamental one requiring strict scrutiny to a much more 
tenuous right opened the floodgates to various state restrictions on 
abortion access.117 
The circuit courts of appeal have split on whether the 
Constitution protects a constitutional right against the disclosure of 
private information, though the majority recognize some protection.118 
Most of those agree that the right is not one that provides extensive 
 
 114. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 464 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the proper test for invalidating abortion restrictions as 
involving “absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision.”). 
 115. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights 
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675 (2004). 
 118. The right is recognized in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits. See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We have observed 
that the relevant Supreme Court precedents delineate at least two distant kinds of 
constitutionally-protected privacy interests . . . .”); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (“The existence of the [constitutional] right . . . has been expressly rejected by the 
Sixth Circuit . . . . [b]ut it is recognized by our court and was in 1992.”); James v. City of 
Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1991) (“This court’s predecessor, in a series of cases 
decided after Whalen, began to flesh out the parameters of the individual’s interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.”); Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) (“That a person 
has a constitutional right to privacy is now well established. Such right includes ‘the individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . . .’” (citations omitted)); Barry v. City of 
New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Most courts considering the question . . . appear 
to agree that privacy of personal matters is a protected interest.”); Denver Policemen’s 
Protective Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1981) (“The Association defines 
this right to privacy as a right to confidentiality. It is, specifically, a right to prevent disclosure of 
personal matters.”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(“The privacy interest asserted in this case falls within the first category referred to in Whalen v. 
Roe, the right not to have an individual’s private affairs made public by the government.”); 
Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. Unit B 1978) (“The first strand [of the privacy 
right], described by this circuit as ‘the right to confidentiality,’ is broader in some respects [than 
the autonomy strand].” (citation omitted)). 
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protection.119 The three circuits120 that have rejected attempts to infer a 
specific right to informational privacy cite the lack of a clear mandate 
from the Supreme Court.121 Courts in these circuits generally examine 
the challenged regulations and statutes under rational basis review, 
upholding them unless the alleged privacy right implicates a 
fundamental interest.122 
The circuits that recognize the informational privacy right have 
employed a similar balancing test to that described in Nixon to 
determine whether a state intrusion into personal information is 
warranted.123 Balancing tests are notoriously difficult to administer in 
this context.124 Generally, as in Nixon, courts give weight to the 
government’s interest in obtaining the information and the 
protections the statute or regulation provides against unauthorized 
public disclosure. The type of personal information is given special 
 
 119. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 497 
(1995) (arguing that any articulated government interest, when combined with “reasonable” 
security measures, is enough to uphold information collection). 
 120. The Sixth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits do not recognize a constitutional 
right to informational privacy. 
 121. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e are unable to see how 
such a constitutional right of privacy can be restricted to anything less than the general ‘right to 
be let alone.’” (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928))); see also Am. 
Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“The Supreme Court has addressed the issue in recurring dicta without, we believe, resolving 
it.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (“‘[T]he Constitution does 
not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information.’ . . . Only when 
‘fundamental’ rights are implicated does a privacy concern take on constitutional dimensions.”). 
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit relied upon language from a precursor case to Whalen. See J.P., 
653 F.2d at 1088 (“The Court recognized that ‘zones of privacy may be created by more specific 
constitutional guarantees’ . . . [but] ‘personal rights found in the guarantee of personal privacy 
must be limited to those which are fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” 
(quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Some 
commentators believe this reliance is misguided. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15–16, at 1398 (2d ed. 1988) (cited in Frances S. Chilapowski, Note, 
The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 149 (1991). 
 123. See, e.g., Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559 (noting that most courts agree that “some form of . . . 
balancing approach is appropriate as a standard of review. The Supreme Court itself appeared 
to use a balancing test . . . .” (citation omitted)). Some courts have prefaced the balancing with a 
discussion of whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy; courts are 
generally unanimous that an individual has such an expectation about his sexual affairs and 
physical and mental health. Deborah A. Ausburn, Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy 
and Family Testimonial Privilege, 20 GA. L. REV. 173, 203–04 (1985). 
 124. See Doe v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 941 F.2d 780, 797 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
balancing the right to confidentiality against the need for disclosure was “difficult”). 
04__BODGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:08 PM 
2006] INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY & ABORTION 601 
consideration; where the information is medical in nature, special 
considerations apply.125 
Of the courts to approach this problem, the clearest elucidation 
of the factors to consider came from the Third Circuit shortly after 
the Whalen decision, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.126 
The case involved a union complaint to the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) that workers at the 
Westinghouse factory were having an allergic reaction to a chemical 
produced there.127 NIOSH launched an investigation and issued a 
subpoena duces tecum of the medical records of “all employees 
presently employed” in the area of the factory where the chemical 
was being manufactured.128 
In allowing NIOSH to proceed with the subpoena, the Third 
Circuit considered seven factors to be examined in determining 
whether to allow government access to individual records: the type of 
record requested; the information it contained; the potential for harm 
to the individual should an unauthorized disclosure occur; the injury 
that such disclosure would cause to the relationship in which the 
record was developed; the adequacy of safeguards to prevent 
unwarranted disclosure; the degree of need for access; and whether 
there was an “express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or 
other recognizable public interest militating toward access.”129 
The Westinghouse factors delineate a clear framework for 
examining whether a government action constitutes a violation of 
informational privacy; several other circuits have either explicitly or 
implicitly discussed these factors when determining whether a 
government intrusion is warranted.130 
 
 125. In processing a labor grievance, the National Labor Relations Board sought access to 
certain employees’ scores in psychological aptitude tests. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 
301, 303 (1979). The Supreme Court denied the request, stating that the NLRB had cited “no 
principle of national labor policy” that would warrant the violation of the employees’ interest in 
confidentiality. Id. at 315. 
 126. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980). The framework 
introduced in this case has been incorporated into the informational privacy jurisprudence of 
other circuits. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(listing Westinghouse factors). 
 127. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 572. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 578. 
 130. See, e.g., Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 n.7 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that a “number 
of our sister circuits have adopted a variation of the balancing test articulated by the Third 
Circuit [in Westinghouse]”). 
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III.  APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TEST 
The nature of the information being sought in the clinics’ case, 
along with the potential for harm and increasing public pressure 
surrounding medical records, all weigh in favor of extending the 
informational privacy right to protect the reproductive health 
information of minors. Most crucially, seizure of the medical files of 
minor patients is unlikely to advance the state’s interest in 
investigating potential child sexual abuse because the information 
contained therein would identify neither the nature of the sexual 
relationship nor the age of the minor’s partner. 
The circuit courts are divided over the level of state interest 
required to overcome a patient’s confidentiality right. Some hold that 
a legitimate state interest is sufficient,131 others require a compelling 
state interest,132 and still others apply some form of intermediate 
scrutiny.133 Regardless, broadly interpreted disclosure requirements 
for minors’ sexual activity do not serve even a legitimate state 
interest, because obtaining abortion records is not likely to lead to 
state prosecution of statutory rapists, much less the protection of 
minor women from sexual abuse. 
It is true that states have a compelling interest in investigating 
and reducing crime.134 The information that the state purportedly 
seeks, however—the admission by a minor that her sexual partner is 
substantially older, the identity of the sexual partner, and the 
circumstances of the sexual relationship—is unlikely to be contained 
in her health record.135 Moreover, in states where the definition of 
 
 131. See, e.g., Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that there was a 
legitimate public interest in providing a safe and healthy educational environment, and that 
interest was sufficient to sustain school district’s requirement that a teacher see a psychiatrist). 
 132. See, e.g., Denver Policemen’s Prot. Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 
1981) (holding that ascertainment of the truth and defendant’s right to exculpatory material 
constituted compelling state interests sufficient to overcome police association’s privacy interest 
in personnel files). 
 133. See, e.g., Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[A]n 
intermediate standard of review seems in keeping both with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
recognize new fundamental interests [that would require strict scrutiny review] . . . and the 
Court’s recognition that some form of scrutiny beyond rational relation is necessary to 
safeguard the confidentiality interest.”). 
 134. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700–01 (1972) (“[T]he investigation of crime by 
the grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person 
and property of the citizen. . . .”). 
 135. Cf. id. (holding that the grand juries did not abuse their discretion because they did not 
“attempt to invade protected First Amendment rights by forcing wholesale disclosure of names 
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statutory rape depends on the disparity in ages between sexual 
partners, the information required to determine that a crime had even 
occurred—let alone sufficient information to identify the 
perpetrator—would not be contained in the minor’s medical record. 
It is also undisputed that the state has an interest in protecting 
minors from injury caused by sexual abuse, and that the state’s 
compelling interest extends to the investigation of possible injury. To 
that end, the ability of the state to screen reports of abuse is helpful to 
determining whether a history of abuse exists.136 Because the health 
services of most states decline to investigate consensual sex between 
two minors of similar age,137 however, many patients whose records 
are disclosed to the government agency will not ultimately be the 
subject of investigations. Where there is no reason to suspect abuse, 
as in the case of consensual sexual activity between age-mates, 
disclosure of the minor’s medical information will come for no 
reason. 
Several factors hint that public policies on the state and federal 
level may actually argue against access. First, public concern over the 
accessibility of health records has led to increasing efforts on the 
federal and state level to protect medical information.138 The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act protects the privacy of 
personally identifying medical information retained by health care 
providers.139 Nearly every state provides some protection for data 
which the state collects for public health purposes, and most states—
though not all—have enshrined the provider-patient privilege in 
statute.140 The Third Circuit examined the then-nascent privacy 
movement in elucidating its Westinghouse test, citing the 1974 Privacy 
 
and organizational affiliations for a purpose that was not germane to the determination of 
whether crime has been committed . . . .”). 
 136. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1287 (D. Kan. 2004). 
 137. For example, Kansas Social and Rehabilitation Services states that it does not pursue 
reports of “[m]utual sexual exploration of age-mates (no force, power differential, or incest 
issues),” because such “[r]eport[s] concern[] ‘lifestyle’ issues that do not directly harm a child.” 
KAN. SOC. & REHABILITATION SERVS., CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES POLICY AND 
PROCEDURE MANUAL § 1361(B) (2006), available at http://www.srskansas.org/CFS/ 
cfp_manuals/ppmepmanuals/ppm_manual/PPM%20Sections%20Jan%2006/SECTION%20100
0.htm. 
 138. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Nationalization of Health Information Privacy 
Protections, 37 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1113, 1113 (2002). 
 139. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 140. Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal 
Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 327, 335–36 (2002). 
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Act, a specific exemption in the Freedom of Information Act for 
medical files, and the requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedures that movants requesting discovery of medical records or 
reports face a higher burden of need than those requesting other 
records.141 
Other federal and state statutes specifically recognize the 
importance of confidentiality in the provision of health care to 
adolescents. Title X of the Public Health Service Act and the federal 
Medicaid statute both authorize confidential access to family planning 
services for minors.142 Currently, every state allows minors to consent 
on their own to testing of, and treatment for, sexually transmitted 
diseases.143 Some states have similar laws regarding mental health 
services and substance abuse treatment, and more than twenty 
currently allow minors to consent to contraceptive services.144 
Though the “right to privacy in connection with decisions 
affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults,”145 states 
may go further in regulating access to abortion for minors—and most 
do.146 Indeed, legislators and courts have been restricting the 
decisional-privacy rights of minors for nearly as long as the right has 
been recognized.147 In the context of the judicial bypass process, 
however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance 
of confidentiality.148 Some courts have recognized that minors have a 
right to informational privacy similar to, if not entirely coextensive 
with, that of adults.149 Although complete anonymity is not required, 
when adolescents seek abortion services the state must at least 
 
 141. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 142. Cynthia Dailard & Chinué Turner Richardson, Teenagers’ Access to Confidential 
Reproductive Health Services, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 7–8 (2003), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/4/gr080406.pdf. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977). 
 146. As of June 2006, forty-four states had enacted laws mandating some sort of parental 
involvement (either consent or notice) before a minor can obtain abortion services, though 
several of those statutes are either permanently enjoined or currently being challenged. Center 
for Reproductive Rights, Restrictions on Young Women’s Access to Abortion Services, 
http://www.crlp.org/pub_fac_restrictions.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
 147. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (“[P]arental authority is not inconsistent 
with our tradition of individual liberty.”). 
 148. Id. at 643–44 (“The [judicial bypass process] must assure that a resolution of the issue, 
and any appeals that follow, will be completed with anonymity. . . .”). 
 149. Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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employ “reasonable steps to prevent the public from learning of the 
minor’s identity.”150 
The Supreme Court has noted that patients have a heightened 
expectation of privacy over their medical information,151 and that 
patients may be protected from disclosure of the results of medical 
tests even if those tests might reveal illegal activity.152 Society accepts 
medical matters as private issues to which the informational privacy 
right applies,153 and the type of personal information contained in a 
medical record may affect the level of privacy protection it receives.154 
The medical records of abortion patients contain some of the most 
private, intimate details of patients’ lives, such as medical history, 
number of previous abortions, and the type of procedure the patient 
is obtaining;155 medical records link this information to a patient’s 
name, address, and date of birth. Patients have a very strong 
expectation of privacy in those records—an expectation that the 
medical information contained therein will be withheld not only from 
the public at large but also from the government.156 
Certainly the medical field in general has a long “history of 
respect towards the recognized need for privacy in the doctor-patient 
relationship.”157 The doctor-patient relationship is built on trust; 
patients feel free to confide in their doctors because they know that 
their doctor will not reveal medical information to a third party. The 
breakdown of that implicit promise would undoubtedly cause 
adolescents to withhold relevant medical information from their 
 
 150. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 513 (1990). 
 151. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001). 
 152. Id. at 68. 
 153. See Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000) (declaring that in the Seventh 
Circuit the right to confidentiality “clearly covers medical records and communications” 
(citations omitted)); see also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (noting that medical records “are well within the ambit of materials entitled to 
privacy protection”). 
 154. For example, information deemed “sensitive” may merit higher protection. See Bloch 
v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 685–87 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that details of a rape are sensitive and a 
rape victim should be accorded broader confidentiality right). Other courts have explicitly 
included sexual information within the realm of sensitive personal information to which the 
privacy right applies. See Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(allowing constitutional protection for “facts about [plaintiff’s] sexual history”); Thorne v. City 
of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that details about a plaintiff’s sexual 
history and a prior miscarriage were protected information). 
 155. Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 216 (E.D. La. 1980). 
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physicians, causing harm to the physician-patient relationship and 
risking real injury to their health.158 Recognizing this, many medical 
organizations have articulated policy statements that discourage the 
enactment of broad and inflexible reporting requirements.159 
Additionally, no clear evidence shows that mandatory reporting of 
statutory rape benefits the supposed victim—especially where the 
sexual activity was consensual.160 
Perhaps unique among medical patients, abortion patients have 
an urgent need for confidentiality because the public revelation that a 
woman is seeking an abortion can lead to threats of violence, 
harassment, and ostracism from the community.161 Language from the 
Second Circuit explaining why an individual with HIV was entitled to 
constitutional confidentiality protection is equally applicable in the 
abortion context: 
Extension of the right to confidentiality to personal medical 
information recognizes there are few matters that are quite so 
personal as the status of one’s health, and few matters the 
dissemination of which one would prefer to maintain greater control 
 
 158. See generally Carol A. Ford et al., Influence of Physician Confidentiality Assurances on 
Adolescents’ Willingness to Disclose Information and Seek Future Health Care: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 278 JAMA 1029 (1997) (finding that assurances of unconditional 
confidentiality increased the number of adolescents willing to return to seek further health care 
by 10 percent); Jonathan D. Klein et al., Access to Medical Care for Adolescents: Results from 
the 1997 Commonwealth Fund Survey of the Health of Adolescent Girls, 25 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 120 (1999) (finding that nearly a third of the adolescents surveyed had missed needed 
care; the most common reason was not wanting a parent to know); Diane M. Reddy et al., Effect 
of Mandatory Parental Notification on Adolescent Girls’ Use of Sexual Health Care Services, 288 
JAMA 710 (2002) (finding that 59 percent of girls younger than eighteen seeking services at 
Planned Parenthood clinic indicated they would stop using all sexual health care services or 
delay treatment or testing for STDs if their parents were informed that they were seeking 
contraceptives). 
 159. See, e.g., American Academy of Family Physicians et al., Protecting Adolescents: 
Ensuring Access to Care and Reporting Sexual Activity and Abuse, 35 J. Adolescent Health 420, 
423 (2004) (“Federal and state laws should allow physicians and other health care professionals 
to exercise appropriate clinical judgment in reporting cases of sexual activity. . . .”). 
 160. English and Teare suggest that adolescents may feel they are being used as “pawns” by 
law enforcement, noting an ABA report that described a strategy of arresting suspected gang 
members for statutory rape when other charges were unavailable. English & Teare, supra note 
39, at 841 (discussing Sally Small Inada, Improving the Criminal Justice Response to Statutory 
Rape, 17 CHILD L. PRAC. 157, 157 (1998)). 
 161. Alice Clapman, Privacy Rights and Abortion Outing: A Proposal for Using Common-
Law Torts to Protect Abortion Patients and Staff, 112 YALE L.J. 1545, 1545–47 (2003) 
(describing actions of a clinic protestor who phoned an abortion patient repeatedly, left anti-
abortion literature and a plastic fetus on her doorstep, and attempted to tell the patient’s 
parents that the woman had received an abortion). 
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over. . . . An individual revealing that she is HIV []positive 
potentially exposes herself . . . to discrimination and intolerance, 
further necessitating the extension of the right to confidentiality 
over such information.162 
A privacy violation can occur not only because of an 
unauthorized disclosure to the public, but also when a large enough 
number of government employees can access the records;163 privacy 
safeguards must therefore place strict limits on which state employees 
may view and use the records, and for what purpose. 
As courts have been willing to uphold statutes giving only the 
barest minimum of safeguards, however,164 privacy advocates may 
have difficulty securing these strict controls. For example, on the 
ground that other state statutes provided adequate protection against 
disclosure, the Fourth Circuit dismissed an informational privacy 
claim against a South Carolina regulation that allowed the state 
health department to retain copies of abortion patients’ unredacted 
medical records.165 Similarly, in upholding the constitutionality of 
Arizona’s judicial bypass procedure, the Ninth Circuit noted the 
presence of a blanket statement in the statute commanding that all 
judicial bypass proceedings remain confidential.166 Moreover, the 
judicial officer was instructed to order that all records be 
confidentially maintained, and state statutes limited the state 
personnel who could access the information.167 Courts have noted 
approvingly the presence of state statutes protecting privacy and 
providing for criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure.168 
 
 162. Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 163. Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 552 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If information that 
a woman has had an abortion is made available to all DHS employees, the fact that they are 
government employees is no solace to the numerous neighbors, relatives and friends of DHS 
employees, as well as to the employees themselves.”). 
 164. See Gostin, supra note 119, at 497 (“Provided the government . . . employs reasonable 
security measures, courts have not interfered. . . .”). 
 165. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health, 317 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1008 (2003). As the dissent notes, other state statutes appear to 
create loopholes in the confidentiality provisions; for example, the public disclosure of patient 
identifying information is authorized during licensing proceedings. Id. at 375 (King, J., 
dissenting). 
 166. Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 788 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Compare Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 513 (1990) (discussing a 
state provision criminalizing disclosure of confidential documents and upholding a reporting 
statute’s constitutionality), with Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 552 (noting the lack of 
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The willingness of courts to accept these measures as adequate 
strains credulity. Evidence introduced in the Greenville Women’s 
Clinic case showed that clinic protestors had obtained from the health 
department the medical records of a fifteen-year-old patient, and 
were distributing photocopies.169 Just a few years before the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Arizona’s judicial bypass 
procedure (citing the criminal penalties that would supposedly deter 
unauthorized disclosure),170 news of a court order allowing a young 
woman to travel out of Arizona for an abortion was leaked to the 
media, presumably by a court employee.171 A similar disclosure 
occurred in Florida, where a state employee publicly revealed names 
from a statewide registry of HIV patients.172 
The existence of state statutes barring the release of medical 
records did little to help an abortion patient in Illinois, who was 
shocked to find her photograph and a copy of her medical records 
posted on the Internet.173 A clinic protestor had obtained them from a 
source at the hospital to which the patient had been transferred 
during her procedure.174 Because abortion protestors are so eager to 
“out” women who have had abortions, very few regulations or 
penalties would adequately safeguard such sensitive medical 
information. 
 
clear civil and criminal penalties for public release by government employees while striking 
down a reporting statute). 
 169. Greenville Women’s Clinic, 317 F.3d at 376 (King, J., dissenting). 
 170. Lawall, 307 F.3d at 787. 
 171. Chris Moeser & Karina Bland, Abortion Fury Grows: Hull Defends Move to Send Teen 
Out of State, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 26, 1999, at A1. 
 172. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., National HIV Case Reporting for the United States—A 
Defining Moment in the History of the Epidemic, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1163 (1997). 
 173. Jo Mannies, Activist Admits Role in Acquiring Medical Records of Abortion Patient, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 23, 2001, at A1. 
 174. Lorna Collier, Patient Photos on Internet Test the Courts, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 2002, at 
C1. Personal details about the woman, including her hometown and information about her 9-
year-old child, were posted on the site “Missionaries to the Unborn” next to a photograph of 
Adolf Hitler. Id. Other websites, including the sporadically available abortioncams.com, feature 
pictures of women entering abortion clinics and encourage volunteers to submit personally 
identifying information. Fox Hannity & Colmes: Does the First Amendment Protect a Website 
That Posts the Names of Abortion Doctors? (Fox News Network television broadcast Apr. 5, 
2001). 
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CONCLUSION 
Given the increasing eagerness of state attorneys general and 
pro-life groups to use the possibility of public exposure as a means to 
intimidate abortion patients and dissuade them from seeking 
abortions, reproductive health advocates need to develop a strong 
legal theory under which to challenge these threats. The 
constitutional right to informational privacy, though limited, must 
protect adolescent abortion patients from the unauthorized release of 
their medical records when state statutory-rape reporting 
requirements are broadly interpreted. 
